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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case

By this appeal, the Schoorls seek a determination that Idaho' s adverse possession and
ejectment statutes, including the limitations periods contained therein, are matters of substantive
law that may not be retroactively applied. From there, the Schoorls seek a further determination
that the limitations period contained within Idaho's adverse possession and ejectment statutes
commences to run at the time a party begins to adversely possess property and that the statutory
limitations period in effect as of that date governs the parties' respective rights, duties, and
obligations.
B.

Concise Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings Below

Plaintiffs Donald Edward Schoorl and Sonia Linn Schoorl, as Trustees of the Donald and
Sonia Schoorl Trust ult/a/ March 2, 2015, brought an action to quiet title to a strip of property
purchased on or about November 11, 2001, by their predecessor in interest, Gerret and Sharon
Schoorl. 1 R. Vol. I, p. 8. After purchasing the property, the Schoorls enclosed the parcel with a
fence and began pasturing animals on it. R. Vol. I, p. 8. 2 The Schoorls have continued to use the
property in that manner and without interruption from November of 2001 until the present date.
R. Vol. I, p. 8.
After being served with process, Guild Mortgage Company3 moved to dismiss based on
the defense that the twenty (20) year limitations period established by the July 1, 2006,
amendments to the adverse possession and ejectment statutes applied to the Schoorls' claims. R.
1

Though the property is now titled in the name of the Trust, the trustees of the trust are Garret Schoorl' s son and
daughter-in-law. Garret and Sharon Schoorl still reside on the premises. Because of this familial relationship and
the continuity of possession, for ease of reference this brief will use the surname Schoorl to reference both the Trust
and the predecessor in interest to the property, Gerret and Sharon Schoorl.
2 Pursuant to 1.A.R. 35, the subject property is depicted in Exhibit A attached hereto.
3 The remaining defendants joined in Guild Mortgage Company's motion to dismiss and asserted identical
arguments. For ease of reference, this brief will refer to only Guild Mortgage Company.
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Vol. I, p. 19.

Based thereon, Guild Mortgage Company argued that the Schoorls had not

possessed the land long enough to acquire the rights established by Idaho's adverse possession
statutes. R. Vol. I, pp. 21-28.
The Schoorls disagreed, arguing that the five (5) year limitations period contained within
the 2001 adverse possession and ejectment statutes-the year when the Schoorls purchased,
enclosed, and began occupying the subject property-applied to their claim to quiet title by
adverse possession. R. Vol. I, pp. 60-63.
The District Court agreed with Guild Mortgage Company' s position and held that the
limitations period contained in the 2006 amendments, rather than the law that was in place when
the adverse possession period began, applied to the Schoorls' claims. R. Vol. I, pp. 79-82.
Because it is undisputed that the Schoorls purchased and have been in possession of the property
since 2001 , the District Court found that they had not possessed the strip for the twenty (20) year
limitations period required by the 2006 statutory amendments and granted defendants' motion to
dismiss. R. Vol. I, pp. 82.
Because the District Court erred in applying the incorrect limitations period, the Schoorls
timely brought this appeal.
II.
1.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Whether the statutory authority providing for rights of adverse possession and

ejectment, including the limitations periods contained therein, are substantive laws that may not
be applied retroactively.
2.

Whether the limitations period for rights and obligations arising under Idaho's

adverse possession and ejectment statutes commences to run as of the date a party begins
adversely possessing the property.
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ID.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

The Schoorls are not seeking attorney fees on appeal.
IV.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Supreme Court freely reviews questions of law. Goodman Oil Co. v. Scotty's Duro-

Bilt Generator, Inc. , 147 Idaho 56, 58, 205 P .3d 1192, 1194 (2009). When reviewing an order
dismissing an action pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) the same standard of review is applied as to a
motion for summary judgment. Coalition/or Agric. 's Future v. Canyon County, No. 42756, 2016
WL 1133369, at *3 (Idaho Mar. 23, 2016). An appeal from an order of summary judgment is
reviewed de novo and the same standard used by the district court in ruling on the motion for
summary judgment is used. Houpt v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass'n, No. 41990, 2016 WL
937694, at *2 (Idaho Mar. 9, 2016), reh'g denied (Mar. 10, 2016). There is no dispute regarding
any issue of fact relevant to this appeal. Rather, the sole dispute is which statute of limitations
applies: a pure question of law.
V.

A.

ARGUMENT

Because Idaho's adverse possession and ejectment statutes, including the limitations
period contained therein, are matters of substantive law, amendments thereto may
not be retroactively applied.
This Court should overturn the decision of the District Court because Idaho' s adverse

possession and ejectment statutes, including the limitations period contained therein, are
substantive and cannot, therefore, be retroactively applied. It is well settled under Idaho law that
"no statute is retroactive ' unless expressly so declared."' Lincoln County v. Fidelity and Deposit

Co. of Maryland, 102 Idaho 489, 491, 632 P.2d 678, 681 (1981) (quoting IDAHO CODE § 73101 ). Statutes that impact substantive rights, rather than strictly procedural or remedial rights,
cannot be applied retroactively. Griggs v. Nash, 116 Idaho 228,235, 775 P.2d 120, 127 (1989).
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Because adverse possession and ejectment statutes are substantive, amendments thereto cannot
be retroactively applied.

1.

Idaho's adverse possession and ejectment statutes are matters of substantive
law.

Idaho's statutory authority regarding the rights and obligations of parties related to
actions for ejectment and acquiring title by adverse possession are matters of substantive law.
Statutes are said to impact substantive rights when they "create, enlarge, diminish or destroy
contractual or vested rights." Myers v. Vermass, 114 Idaho 85, 87, 753 P.2d 296, 298 (Ct. App.
1988) (holding that the amendment of a statute to mandate an award of attorney's fees "enlarged
the scope of entitlement to mandatory attorney fee awards" and, as such, was properly
characterized as substantive) cf Jensen v. Shank, 99 Idaho 565, 585 P.2d 1276 (1978) (holding
that amendment to statute allowing for discretionary award of attorney's fees was remedial).
Adverse possession statutes create vested property rights; their corollaries, ejectrnent statutes,
destroy those same vested property rights.
In supporting its decision to retroactively apply the 2006 amendment to the limitations
period contained within Idaho's adverse possession and ejectrnent statutes, the District Court
erroneously concluded that, because the rights were not fully vested (i.e., because the limitations
periods had not fully run), the adverse possession and ejectrnent statutes were not substantive.
This was an incorrect analysis of the substantive vs. procedural/remedial distinction.
In its decision, the District Court incorrectly characterized the Schoorls as arguing that:
"Application of the amended version . . . would be impermissibly retroactive because it would
'create, enlarge, diminish or destroy' their 'vested' right to claim ownership of the subject
property by adverse possession." R. Vol. I, p. 79. By its selective use of quoted words from the
relevant phraseology, the District Court applied the law so as to deem any rights that were not
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 4

fully vested, any transaction that was not final and complete, at the time of a statutory
amendment could be impacted by said statutory amendment. That is not, however, the argument
made by the Schoorls nor is it the state ofldaho law.
The case of Myers v. Vermaas makes it clear that where a party undertakes certain legal
actions with known attendant consequ ences-in that case, the filing of a lawsuit- that any law
that would thereafter change or alter those known attendant consequences constitutes a
substantive law that cannot be retroactively applied. 114 Idaho 85, 753 P.2d 296 (Ct. App. 1988).
In Vermaas, the Court of Appeals held that a legislative amendment to a mandatory attorney' s
fees statute was substantive and therefore, could not apply to a lawsuit that had already been
filed and was pending at the time of the amendment. Id. at 87. The Court of Appeals reasoned
that the statute "affects decisions to litigate commercial disputes" and that retroactive application
of the legislation would "distort [the] decision making process" by "profoundly alter[ing]- after
the fact-the costs and benefits of submitting a meritorious (albeit disputed) claim to the courts
for resolution ." Id; see also Griggs v. Nash, 116 Idaho 228, 235, 775 P.2d 120, 127 (1989)
(affirming the reasoning of the Court of Appeals) .
It cannot be gainsaid that the commencement of a lawsuit, in and of itself, constitutes a
''vested right" or a "completed transaction" in the sense that the District Court relied on those
terms when it denied the Schoorls' claims.

Rather, the commencement of a lawsuit is a

triggering event that leads to the creation (or destruction) of vested rights. 4 Accordingly, that
4

The case of Tuttle v. Wayment Farms, Inc. , lends further support to the Schoorls' position that
whether the
retroactive application of a statute impacts substantive rights is a function of the date of the "triggering
event" that
would be impacted by applying the statute. 131 Idaho 105,108,9 52 P.2d 1241, 1244 (1998). In Tuttle,
a lawsuit
had been filed and was pending when an amendment governing allocation of damages between joint
tortfeasors
came into effect. Id. After the statute was passed, the litigants entered into a settlement agreement
to which the
amended statute applied. Id. The Court reasoned that as of the date the amendmen t was passed,
the settlement
agreement that would be impacted by the statute was not yet in place. Id Because the creation of
the contractual
settlement agreement, rather than the initiation of the lawsuit, served as the triggering event, the Court
concluded
that applying the amendmen t did not constitute a retroactive application of the statute. Id.
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triggering event locks into place the substantive rights of the parties that will govern the legal
relationship between them moving forward in that legal context-even though their respective
rights relating to the lawsuit will not be "vested" or "matured" until the lawsuit is ultimately
resolved.
Just as a mandatory attorney fee award constitutes a substantive law that necessarily
impacts a party' s decision making process when deciding to file a lawsuit, the mandatory
requirements of adverse possession and ejectment statutes are substantive laws that will
necessarily impact the decision making process of a party engaging in actions necessary to
satisfy the requirements of the adverse possession statute. Accordingly, just as retroactive
application of the mandatory attorney fee award will "profoundly alter-after the fact-the costs
and benefits" of filing a lawsuit, so too would the retroactive application of any change to the
requirements of an adverse possession or ejectment statute.
Adverse possession statutes set forth specific requirements that a party must follow in
order to create vested property rights. Ejectment statutes set forth specific requirements that a
party must follow or their vested property rights will be destroyed in favor of the adverse
possessor. These laws are substantive laws that create and destroy vested rights. Because they
are substantive, any amendments thereto may not be retroactively applied.
2.

The limitations period contained within Idaho's adverse possession and
ejectment statutes are substantive.

In this matter, the particular statutory requirement that was amended in the adverse
possession and ejectment statutes was the amount of time within which a party is required to
bring an action for ejectment in order to prevent that party from losing its property rights to the
adverse possessor. Stated simply, the limitations period changed. Given that adverse possession
and ejectment statutes are substantive, the limitations periods contained within such statutes
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constitute an integral part of the statutory rights thereby created or destroyed. Accordingly,
the
District Court erred by retroactively applying the amended limitations period from the
adverse
possession and ejectment statutes as a bar to the Schoorls' claim.
Statutes of limitation may be characterized as substantive, remedial, or procedural:
"Statute of limitations are neither substantive nor procedural per se but have 'mixed substant
ive
and procedural aspects ."' Lujan v. Regents of U of Cal. 69 FJd 1511 , 1516 (10th Cir.
1995)
(quoting Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 736, 108 S.Ct. 2117, 2129 (1988) (Brenna
n, J.,
concurring)).

"Depending on the context, courts have reached different conclusions about

whether a statute of limitations is substantive or procedural." Id. (cataloguing numerous
cases).
Whether limitations periods are substantive, procedural, or remedial is not simply a
matter of judicial whim or case-by-case convenience. It is well settled that limitations
periods
contained within a statutory act that gives rise to a particular right are properly characte
rized as
substantive. "[W]he re a statute of limitations does not merely bar the remedy for the violatio
n of
a right but limits or conditions the right itself, courts have treated the statute as substantive."
Id.
at 1517. "A statute of limitations that restricts a right created by statute rather than a
right at
commo n law generally is deemed to be a substantive limit on the right as opposed to
a mere
procedural limit on the remedy. " Sarfati v. Wood Holly Associates, 874 F.2d 1523, 1525
(11th
Cir. 1989).
Adverse possession is a statutorily created right that did not exist at commo n law. "The
commo n law did not recognize a transference of title through adverse possession. Such
law
seemed to be oppugnant to one of the most fundamental axioms of the law." J & M Land
Co. v.

First Union Nat. Bank, 166 N.J. 493, 500-01 (2001)5 (citations omitted). Because adverse
5
For a detailed, historical discussion of the statutory development of adverse possession
as a means of acquiring
title to property, see J & M Land Co. v. First Union Nat. Bank, 166 N.J. 493, 501-02 (2001).
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possession is a statutorily created right, the limitations periods contained in adverse possession
statutes are properly characterized as substantive.
Addressing a situation directly analogous to the case at hand, Sarfati v. Wood Holly
Associates determined that the action should be governed by the limitations period in effect when

the cause of action to enforce a statutorily created right accrued-not the longer limitations
period set forth by amendment. 874 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir. 1989). In Sarfati, after a statutorily
created right accrued, but before it had expired, legislative amendment extended the statutory
limitations period.

The 11th Circuit was asked to decide whether to apply the two year

limitations period that existed at the time the cause of action accrued or the three year limitations
period contained in the amended statute. Id. at 1524-25.
After undertaking a detailed study, the Sarfati Court noted that where the limitations
provision is an integral part of the right created, it is deemed to be substantive and not
procedural. Id. at 1525. The Court went on to note that "an amendment to a limitations period
that is an integral part of the right will not be retroactively applied to cover causes of action
already in existence, unless the legislature manifests such an intent." Id. at 1526 (multiple
citations omitted).
The Sarfati Court further explained that in order for a limitations period to be considered
an integral part of the statute giving rise to the right, the limitations period must be contained in
the act creating the right itself, not a different act or a borrowed or general limitations provision.
Id ; accord J & M Land Co. v. First Union Nat. Bank, 166 N.J. 493, 517 (2001) ("A substantive

statute of limitations is found in legislation creating a cause of action that did not exist at
common law."). Finding that the limitations period was an integral part of the right itself, the
Sarfati Court held that the limitations period was substantive and not procedural and, based
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thereon, applied the limitations period that was in place at the time the cause of action accrued,
not the extended limitations period provided by subsequent legislative amendment. 6 Id. at 152728. This result is consistent with cases dealing with amendments to limitations periods in
adverse possession and ejectment statutes. See Petropoulos v. City of West Allis, 148 Wis.2d
762, 768, 436 N.W.2d 880, 882 (1989) (applying 40-year limitations period that existed when
adverse possession commenced rather than the 20-year limitations period established by
amendment) and Lyles v. Roach, 30 S.C. 291, 9 S.E. 334 (1889) (applying 20-year limitations
period that existed when adverse possession commenced rather than the 10-year limitations
period established by amendment).
Adverse possession statutes create vested property rights; ejectment statutes destroy
vested property rights. Consistent with Idaho law, because these statutes create and/or destroy
vested property rights, they are substantive and cannot be applied retroactively. Moreover, the
limitations periods contained within adverse possession and ejectment statutes are integral to the
rights created and destroyed by such statutory enactments. Because these limitations periods are
integral to substantive law they are properly characterized as substantive limitations periods and
amendments thereto cannot be retroactively applied.
B.

The District Court erred by refusing to apply the 2001 limitations period that was in
place at the time the Schoorls purchased the property and commenced their adverse
possession.

Once it is settled that the limitations periods of the adverse possession and ejectment
statutes may not be retroactively applied, it becomes necessary to determine the triggering event
for deciding which limitations period applies.

6

In its decision, the District Court correctly

The Sarfati Court also appropriately analyzed whether the legislature expressly stated that the act should be
applied
retroactively, as that is the second scenario in which amendments affecting substantive rights may be retroactive
ly
applied. Id. at 1525, 1527-28. There is no indication that the legislature intended that the 2006 amendmen
ts to
Idaho's adverse possession and ejectment statutes be retroactively applied.
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observed that IDAHO CODE § 5-203 "sets forth a limitations period after which original owners
may no longer seek to eject adverse possessors." R. Vol. I, p. 80. The Court also correctly noted
that a claim to title by adverse possession "matures" only after the full statutory period has run.
R. Vol. I, p. 80. The Court erred, however, in concluding that the maturity date of an adverse

possession claim-ra ther than the commencement date of the actions constituting adverse
possessi on-was the triggering event that determined the applicable limitations period.
It is well settled and, indeed, the District Court acknowledged, that a cause of action for a

right of re-entry accrues the moment adverse possession begins.

R. Vol. I, p. 80 ( citing

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 460 cmt. a (1944) (explaining "ejectment 'statutes
prescribe a fixed period of time after which no entry may be made nor action brought to recover
the possession of land'"); id. § 465 cmt. a (explaining "a cause of action arises against" the
adverse possessor "at the moment the use is made"). Indeed, this authority is consistent with the
results reached by cases addressing the applicable limitations period for actions for ejectment or
adverse possession, which universally hold that it is the moment that the owner becomes made
aware of acts constituting adverse possession that the limitations period begins to run. Smith v.

Long, 76 Idaho 265,276 , 281 P.2d 483,491 (1955) ("Section 5-205 LC., requires action to be
commenced within five years of the accrual of a right of entry."); Petropoulos v. City of West
Allis, 148 Wis.2d 762,768 ,436 N.W.2d 880,882 (1989) (holding that the key date was the date

the owners had notice that the adverse possessor was attempting to reclaim the disputed
property); Lyles v. Roach, 30 S.C. 291, 9 S.E. 334, 335 (1889) ("The currency of the statute
commences when the cause of action accrues ... 'Whenever there is a plaintiff who can sue and a
defendant who can be sued the statute begins to run. A right of action has accrued,' and the
limitation in force at the accrual of the right is the limitation which must govern.").
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Despite correctly noting that a cause of action for ejectment accrues the moment adverse
possession begins, the District Court failed to follow Idaho law that makes it clear the applicable
limitations period is the period in place at the time a cause of action accrues. Stoner v. Carr, 97
Idaho 641,643,550 P.2d 259,261 (1976) (holding that the triggering event was the discovery of
the foreign object in the patient and that the limitations period at the time that event occurred was
the controlling statute).
In order to support its decision, the District Court treated adverse possession and
ejectment statutory limitations periods as remedial rather than substantive.

R. Vol. I, p. 81

(relying on IDAHO CODE § 73-107) and R. Vol. I, p. 82 (relying on State v. 0 'Neill, 118 Idaho
244, 248, 796 P.2d 121 , 125 (1990) (discussing limitations periods applicable to criminal
actions).

7

However, because adverse possession and ejectment limitations periods are

substantive the authority upon which the District Court relied to support its decision is inapposite
and its conclusion is error.
This Court should reverse the District Court's decision dismissing the Schoorls' claim to
quiet title through adverse possession because such decision was based on the erroneous
retroactive application of the 2006 amendments to the adverse possession and ejectment statutes.

VI.

CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, the Schoorls respectfully request that this Court hold that the

limitations period contained within Idaho's adverse possession and ejectment statutes are matters

7

Notably, the Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that immunity from suit is not a vested property right. Hecla
Min. Co. v. Idaho State Tax. Comm'n, 108 Idaho 147, 150,697 P.2d 1161, 1164 (1985). Accordingly, cases dealing
with the expiration of a limitations period, particularly when said limitations period does not impact a substantive
right, are not controlling in this matter. "Where a lapse of time has not invested a party with title to real or personal
property, a state legislature may extend a lapsed statute of limitations without violating the fourteenth amendment,
regardless of whether the effect is seen as creating or reviving a barred claim." Id. While this appeal deals with an
amended limitations period that had not fully run, this case is instructive in demonstrating that limitations periods
addressing substantive rights (i.e., real property rights) are materially different than limitations periods involving a
criminal's right to repose from suit.
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of substantive law that cannot be retroactively applied. The Schoorls further request that this
Court hold that the event that triggers the running of the limitations periods contained in adverse
possession and ejectment statutes is the date the actions commencing adverse possession begin.
From there, the Schoorls request that this Court remand the matter for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
Dated this 3rd day of May, 2016.

Respectfully Submitted,

FISHER RAINEY HUDSON

By ;-Z f.f{;~
Rebecca A. Rainey
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copy of APPELLANT'S BRIEF was caused to be served on the parties by the method indicated
below.
Loren Ipsen
Joseph Pirtle
Elam & Burke, P.A.
251 E. Front St., Ste. 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, Idaho 83701-1539

(>4..Yia U.S. Mail
( ) Via Facsimile - (208) 384-5844
( ) Via Overnight Mail
( ) Via Hand Delivery

Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents Guild
Mortgage Company and Mortgage Electronic
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6757 Bennett Road
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Rebecca A. Rainey
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